







Europe the Spoil-Sport: On the Europeans Reluctance Towards Genetically Modified Food
By Helge Torgersen, Jesper Lassen, Erling Jelsoe, Timo
Rusanen and Torben Hviid Nielsen1,2
Americans tend to see the difficulty in exporting crops grown
from genetically modified plants to the European Union
(EU) in terms of European protectionism. However, the
action of the EU may also be seen as the outcome of its
emphasis to reconcile regulatory discrepancies among mem-
ber countries political cultures and their respective framing
of the biotechnology problem. Public perception varies
from country to country and has its impact on the regula-
tory practice. Since consumer trust in food regulation and
in experts decreased after events like the BSE crisis, the EU
Commission has become extremely careful. However, the
debate cannot be reduced to a simple risk controversy. The
issue of food from modern biotechnology elicits deeper con-
cerns with many Europeans about, for example, the rela-
tionship between regulation and the environment and about
aspects of modernisation itself. Different rationalities com-
pete for a more conservative (Blue) and a more environmen-
talist (Green) critique. In the light of other controversies, the
biotechnology problem can even be interpreted as the nor-
mal case. The EU tries to accommodate social and political
concerns implicitly while retaining the rhetoric of risk-
based scientific argumentation. Nevertheless, as an answer
to increasing critique, a more culturally determined ration-
ality gains influence on practical decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
O
ver the last years there was extensive debate in
Europe over genetically modified (or, as some may
prefer to call them, enhanced) crop plants and food
products. In some countries, they were subject to unfa-
vourable press campaigns, and the public, as measured
by surveys, remained ambivalent to openly hostile,
while those in medicine are considered benign.3 In par-
ticular, the import and the labelling of commodity crops
grown from such plants in the United States (US) and in
Canada caused a major stir. The EU appears reluctant to
let these goods enter the internal market, although
agreements on free trade would have obliged to allow
the imports.4 US authorities have frequently argued that
these commodities are only more competitivly produced
due to the achievements of modern biotechnology, and
that the EU is putting up undue barriers. They stressed
the point that there is no scientific evidence of any risk
to human health or the environment. This line of argu-
mentation implying that only the result of the scientific
risk assessment of the product counts, regardless of the
process of production, was conceded valid in principle by
the Europeans as well,5 nevertheless does the EU not
grant permissions to such crops. Moreover, the EU has
already succeeded to influence international bodies like
the OECD with their policyor, rather, non-policy, hit-
ting free trade and sound science.6 According to US
officials, a major trade war is pending.7
So why wont Europe play ball? Are the Europeans
really afraid of these crops, and if so, why? Are there
hidden risks that were not detected by US scrutiny? Or
is it because the European press runs havoc, inspired by
non-governmental organisation (NGO) activism that
lacks any scientific base, and regulators follow slavishly
what they claim to be public opinion? Or are the objec-
tions only put forward in order to protect European
agricultural producers and circumvent the world trade
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agreement? From an American, science and economy
based point of view, there are no obvious reasons that
could account for the EU behaviour other than sheer
protectionism.
However, are things that easy? Or is the seeming reluc-
tance of the EU bureaucracy only the surface, and the
ripples are caused by deeper streamings invisible at first
glance? In other words: is it only a controversy over alleged
risks and economic benefits, or does the resistance to
commodity crops from modern biotechnology point to
more? Is it a failure of scientific experts to convince cow-
ardly regulators and a deliberately misled public, or is it,
in the end, a sign of a general European anti-modernism?
THE EUROPEAN UNION
AN INTRICATE NETWORK
Before we approach this question, we might ask
whether there is such a thing as a common European
stance at all that can be compared against the US view.
We have to keep in mind that Europe consists of many
countries, some of which have had long lasting and
profound debates on biotechnology, whereas in others
the discussion has barely begun. Furthermore, they all
have very different regulatory styles and traditions.
Already during the late Seventies and Eighties, when
modern biotechnology was relatively new, these tradi-
tions lead to similar, but still different framings of the
question of how to regulate modern biotechnology, not
only between the US and Europe, but also among the
various EU member countries.8 Although the facts were
more or less the same, the way how the story of biotech-
nology was told differed considerably.9 From the very
beginning, too, the various publics had different de-
mands for the scope of regulation. For example in Ger-
many and Denmark, this demand was much higher than
in southern European countries or in Britain and France.
The EU Commission was well aware of this diversity
when, in the late eighties, it formulated two Biotechnol-
ogy Directives for Contained Use and for Deliberate
Release each.10 One aim was to set up a least common
denominator that all national governments would be
obliged to follow in order to meet the overall aim of
creating an internal market.11 As a concession to the
critics, and as a means to prevent some member coun-
tries (as Denmark and Germany) from imposing further
restrictions, a special guarantee was given. It allowed
any member country to (temporarily) hinder a particu-
lar product from being placed on the domestic market if
the country feared possible negative impacts on the
health of its inhabitants or on its environment. However,
scientific findings that provided evidence for such im-
pacts had to be presented in due time. This was seen as a
substitute for a genuine precautionary principle, which
environmentalists and other critics had demanded as a
counter-weight against a possible tour-de-force strategy
by the industry to introduce products of modern biotech-
nology based on a reductionist understanding of risk.12
But the Commissions task was more complicated,
since country differences did not cease to exist with the
advent of the Directives. Although the economic aspects
were in the forefront in many countries as well as in the
Commission, a deeply rooted diversity in framing of the
perceived problem that modern biotechnology poses re-
mained, which lead to varying interpretations especially
of the Directive on Deliberate Releases. The following
examples may indicate how different the perspectives
were and still are.13
DIVERSITY TO BE RECONCILED
In Britain, interference with individual rights (such as
those of the farmers) is seen as problematic, a view that
also influenced biotechnology regulation. Until recently
officials seemed to be mainly concerned in letting inno-
vation run its course. Although Britain relies extensively
on external and independent expert knowledge in the
decision-making process, secrecy is considered essential.
This is in sharp contrast to Denmark, where the regula-
tory style is characterised by an effort to be relatively
open. Denmark holds the view that state action is legiti-
mate in order to protect future policy options (e.g. for a
sustainable agriculture), and this leads to a more restric-
tive interpretation of the Directive. German authorities
see the problem mainly in terms of regaining com-
petetiveness which appeared to have been lost in a long-
lasting risk debate during the Eighties, when the country
was regarded as reluctant to introduce genetic engineer-
ing. Norway, not a member of the EU but closely asso-
ciated, interprets the problem as one of only supporting
applications which foster sustainable development and
are beneficial for society, without having a clear-cut
definition on what that may be.
A good example for different interpretations provides
the issues of GMO releases. Although there is a common
framework defined by the Directive 90/220 for the
assessment of release proposals. However, the basic un-
derstanding of how a risk assessment is to be performed
as well as the interpretation of the Directives criteria by
the countries competent authorities varied to some ex-
tent.14 What should be the ultimate points to consider?
Until recently, the French authorities thought it was the
perfect molecular characterization of the genetic con-
structthe applicant had to show that he or she is able
to handle the stuff. The British were concerned about
private property rights that may be violated by un-
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wanted side effects. The Dutch were afraid of effects on
natural ecosystems (which, however, in the Netherlands
are not really abundant). And the Danish did not want
to put future options in agriculture into jeopardy. So the
question remained of how to design a European policy
that allows for a common market as well as for the
necessary freedom of individual member countries.15
The picture gets even more complex if we consider the
the relationship between individual countries within the
EU Some have promoted and influenced the shaping of
EU regulations (in the case of biotechnology these had
been Britain and the Netherlands). In contrast, other
countries were latecomers, which merely followed track
and implemented the directives often reluctantly (like
most southern European countries). And there are com-
paratively new EU members holding widely differing
opinions. For example, in Finland the concern is actually
to try to use modern biotechnology as a tool for R. & D.
industrialisation after the deep-going economic reces-
sion in the early 90s. Technology regulation is more or
less left to the experts to everybodys seeming satisfac-
tion. The traditional attitude of paternalistic protection
in Finnish food regulation did not extend to other appli-
cations of biotechthere was no perceived problem. To
the contrary, the Austrian authorities were horrified by
public opinion, and they were quick to adopt the public
rhetoric. In Austria there are many organic farmers, and
an environmentalist interest to prevent the allegedly
disadvantageous biotech applications in agriculture
plays a role.
Further complexity was added by fairly recent policy
changes in France and Britain, countries that had until
then most outspokenly promoted agricultural biotech-
nology. In France, a series of political events including
the installation of a new government led to a revision of
the former promotive policy entirely based on techno-
scientific expertise. Recent developments in Britain have
shown that public opinion does play a significant role in
defining the national framing of the problem of how to
regulate biotechnology. Britain experienced an unex-
pected media campaign that gave the government a hard
time and forced it towards a far less promotive policy.
Additionally, a wave of renewed public concern arose in
previously sceptical countries like Denmark, and the
rejection of agricultural biotech became consolidated in
countries like Austria. In some countries that until then
never had had a particular stance, like Greece, the climate
for genetically altered plants became hostile as well. The
policy shift of two big and important countries like France
and Britain definitely changed the balance within the EU.
It triggered a renewed emphasis to revise the Directive on
Deliberate Release and resulted eventually in a virtual
moratorium until the amended Directive would be enacted.
This regulatory loophole served to provide time until a
new and stabel balance could be found.
Such outcomes of regulatory gridlocks within the EU
are of course not confined to biotechnology. The problem
with a unified Europe is that it still does not exist, even
if there are common EU regulations in some fields.
National peculiarities in the style of regulation, in the
way of dealing with progress (or what some, but not all
the people see as progress) and in the general way of
living and thinking are recalcitrant to change and unifi-
cation. Since almost every subject of regulation has to be
negotiated between the member countries, time delays
occurr and sometimes questionable compromises are
reached in an attempt to muddle through. So it is no
wonder that, for a spectator from outside, sometimes the
EU may appear as a slightly incoherent supranational
agency presenting somewhat awkward arguments from
a scientific point of view, simply in order to cover internal
discrepancies. This may contribute to the EUs image of
bureaucracy and inefficiency that many Americans hold.
However, it is an over-simplification to consider Euro-
peans and their institutions as just inefficient, hierarchi-
cal, over-bureaucratic, immobile and, worst of all,
old-fashioned. The EUs internal variety provides oppor-
tunities for new solutions as well, as its institutions try to
reconcile the differences. Even out of the seeming mess of
current European biotechnology policy there is a chance
that a new and more stable regulatory approach will
emerge, which then will be considered more legitimate.16
SCIENCE AND POLICY
The EU Commission has strived to base policy deci-
sions on scientific expertise as much as any state author-
ity including the US Government did. In the case of
modern biotechnology, only scientifically backed argu-
ments of possible risk to human health and, recently, to
the environment were accepted officially. Consequently,
the role of the so-called Fifth Branch, the scientific advi-
sors, has increased in political importance as in the US17
However, there are differences: in most European states
there is a more consensual style of policy-making than
the adversarial one prevalent in the US18 Consequently,
Europeans leave more regulatory decisions via law-mak-
ing to state authorities and less to the courts. This has
some influrence on the argumentation patterns em-
ployed, and on the relevance of political arguments other
than scientific evidence. So althoughsuperficiallyno
criteria other than scientific evidence are considered
valid, different points of view arising from uncertainty
are considered at least partly legitimate, with the conse-
quence that they simply cannot be neglected.
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In the community decision making process, where
widely differing national (and lobby) interests have to be
reconciled, arguments emerge that hardly fit into the
scheme of risk as described in scientific terms, and that
must be accomodated for political reasons. As a partial
solution to this discrepancy, there is a tendency to re-
frame these arguments into terms of possible risks to
human health and the environment. For example, it was
argued that the recent amendment of the Release Direc-
tive 90/220 demanding a more comprehensive labelling
was to increase transparency and consumer choice as an
end in itself. In a Commissions press release however,
the task of reducing risks was put to the fore: the new
provisions aim was to prevent hazards for consumers
at risk for allergic reactions, who must be given the
opportunity to avoid certain products.19
Nevertheless, sometimes it becomes apparent that
there are other things lurking behind the risk arguments.
An example from a food controversy not related to
genetically modified crops is the struggle over the use of
recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to increase milk pro-
duction. In order to prohibit the use of rBST, the EU relied
mostly on the argument that there is a risk to the health
of the cows treated with the hormone. This was consid-
ered a valid argument because in principle it is consistent
with a scientific view. Although, in reality, the scientific
evidence for harm was a bit shaky, the argument was
more effectively challenged by WTO rules, since it relied
on concerns for animal welfare more than on the proof
of harm to human health. This is not a question of sound
science, but the US could allege the EU of protectionist
impediments of free trade, based on unscientific argu-
mentsthere is of course, at best, circumstantial evi-
dence for a risk to human health. Steroid hormone
application in meat production may be another case
where the allegation of illegitimate market protection
seemed to be substantiated from an US point of view.
But that is not the whole story.
TRUST AND THE IMAGE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
What seems to be protectionist at first glance is a
strategy to stabilise a vulnerable European common
market against the consequences of a loss of consumer
trust in the effectiveness of the regulation. Hence, in the
public, the Commission likes to be seen as upholding a kind
of precautionary principle. The case of hormone treatment
provides an example of how the Commission relied on
arguments that took into account postulated harm but
were, in the eyes of the US authorities, non-substantiated
or, in otherwords,non-scientific, since (enough) conclusive
evidence could not been brought forward.
Indeed, concerning public trust in regulators there are
differences between the US and the mean of the EU
countries,20 and the food regulators fears appear justi-
fied as there have already been severe incidents. Con-
sumer reactions to the Mad Cow Disease provide a lucid
and very impressive example of what may happen to the
internal market in case of public distrust. The events
around the BSE case as well as a recent series of other
food scandals had deep repercussions in the whole food
sector and, by analogy, also influenced attitudes towards
genetically modified crops and the way they are as-
sessed.21 The trust in expert opinion suffered a severe
blow in many European countries, mostly in those that
are highly industrialised (but not in all.)22
Keeping in mind the vast differences also in public
opinion from country to country, we may nevertheless
ask why genetically modified food has a far worse image
in most European countries than in the US Two expla-
nations are frequently put forward by advocates of
biotechnology, namely that the European media influ-
ence public opinion by creating an emotional and nega-
tive image of biotechnology, and that people lack the
scientific knowledge necessary to unmask such stories
as fake. Indeed, in many countries, press coverage has
been rather extensive over the last couple of years.
Especially in Britain it is tempting to draw a causal link
between a recent tabloid campaign and a public percep-
tion that has grown unfavourable. However, such an
influence on public attitudes is not supported by inde-
pendent media analyses, since the overall trend of Euro-
pean press coverage was in fact more favourable than
that in the US.23 Do Europeans, contrary to Americans,
know so little that they can be persuaded of hazards
associated with genetically modified food? If we compare
the average level of textbook knowledge, European citi-
zens do even better in this respect than their US coun-
terparts. However, their image of genetically modified
food products is clearly more menacing.
What is it that separates such food products from
conventional ones in many European consumers eyes?
Food products, on the one hand, are notoriously subject
to scrutinyyou cannot do without them, and eating is
always an act not only of consumption but also of
ingestion. Since comprehensive testing is impossible, the
demand for trust compensating the remaining uncer-
tainty is very high.24 Whereas this is apparently no
problem in the US, it has became difficult in the EU, as
we will argue. Additionally, consumer attitudes towards
food properties are clearly different in Europe and the US
For example, whereas many health-conscious Americans
consider cholesterol as a huge risk and consequently
appreciate products processed to reduce fat, their Euro-
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pean counterparts tend to think of such produce as
artificial and prefer natural, unadulterated ones.
This highlights the fact that for many Europeans
especially from northern countries the term food quality
has a wider meaning. It does not only refer to material
properties like taste, safety, nutritional value, etc., but
also to more immaterial qualities like the way of pro-
duction and its consequences for the environment, ani-
mal welfare, or even ethics. In particular, products of
modern biotechnology tend to stand as a proxy for the
good and evil of modernisation itself.25 So they are
subject to scrutiny for two different reasons: Not only
must they be harmless or even beneficial, but they also
have to prove that modernisation is a good strategy to
follow, and not a one-way cul-de-sac without escape.
This is exemplified by two basic demands that such
products have to meet in the European public: i) they
must not put human health at risk, as well as provide a
benefit to the consumer; ii) their production must not
have deleterious side effects especially with respect to the
environment; on the contrary, there should possibly be
an improvement as compared to traditional ways of
productionif ever possible.
The problem of total food safety suffers from the
paradox that scientific evidence may be overturned by
further experience, which means that there is no proof
for the absence of anything, not least of a risk. However,
at least theoretically there may be a proof for the pres-
ence of some unwanted effects. Evidence thus is
skewedyou will never get the proof of safety, and
uncertainty prevails. There are only two ways to cir-
cumvent the problem: either there is a solid trust in those
who produce and assess the food, or there are obvious
benefits for the consumer that outweigh possible risks.
To many consumers, however, trust in producers and
regulators is a problem. They draw analogies beween
genetic modification and other techniques of modern
industrialized production systems in agriculture and
food processing. Several European countries have seen
debates about the consequences of these systems in
recent years, where experts have tended to downplay the
risks. Salmonella in food, pesticides in drinking water,
animal husbandry that resemble large scale factories,
and, especially in Britain, the problem of BSE act as a
frame of reference. As to the benefits, it appears difficult
for food producers to convince European consumers that
they will profit from modern biotechnology in terms of
better or cheaper products. Many people perceive the
benefits to lay predominantly with the producers and
the risk with the public.26
Consequently, many retail chains have cleared their
shelves from any product that contains genetically
modified ingredients in an attempt to avoid consumer
retaliation. In general, the future of food products from
modern biotechnology looks not too bright at the mo-
ment. Industry is reluctant to really press on with a
heavy lobbying campaign for two reasons. Firstly, it is
difficult to devise a strategy that caters for all the differ-
ent European countries with their particular publics, as
well as for the EU institutions. Secondly, since most of
the big players are also engaged in other areas of biotech-
nology, the agricultural sector as a hot potatoe is not to
their main concern. Until recently in EuropaBio, the
industrys lobby organisation, there (wasnt) a real
concsensus that defending biotechnology in general is
something thats in everybodys interest.27 A recent
advice from the Deutsche Bank to their clients not to
invest into food biotechnology since consumers react
negatively may be indicative for the investors reluctance
against, or even slow retreat from, agricultural biotech-
nology in Europe.28
COMPETING RATIONALITIES
We may have a closer look at the question why
products of modern biotechnology bear such a special
burden in most European countries and especially with
certain groups of the public. As we have seen, to many
consumers the issue of modern biotechnology is not only
concerned with specific scientically defined risks, but in
a broader sense with the way in which we regulate the
interaction between humans and the natural and even
the cultivated environmentand traditional agriculture
is dear to many Europeans. Consequently, there is a
strong social and political dimension.
If we look at such wider arguments, we may group
them, roughly, into three categories of competing ra-
tionalities and call them the Blue Critique, the Green
Critique and the Entrepreneurs promotion.29 The Blue
Critique originates from the conservative end of the
political spectre. It has to do with a general disbelief in
the blessings of modern civilisation and the commercial-
isation of everything, accompanied by a rejection of the
abolishment of the supernatural, with a deep-hearted
conviction that there are borders set by God that must
not be trespassed.
The Green Critiques origin is more politically left. It
concerns the environment that is seen as fragile and that
must not be endangered by commercial activities of
doubtful benefit for society as a whole. Also, the distri-
bution of advantages and disadvantages arising from the
applications of modern biotechnology is too skewed:
only those who already have will gain.
The Entrepreneur s promotion favours modern
biotechnology and concedes the appropriateness of re-
strictions only where there is evidence for or, at least, a
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strong plausibility of risk. It stresses the freedom of
enterprise and the necessity of innovation. This goes
hand in hand with a reminder that Europe may loose
competitiveness when indulging into non-risk based
arguments. Although these types may differ from coun-
try to country as well as over time, they exist almost
everywhere and have put their mark on many a debate
about biotechnology regulation.
An example of the competition between the Green and
the Entrepreneurs rationality is the question of labelling
already addressed. The Blue may consider such products
as morally flawed, so that they must be labelled in order
to be avoided. The Green may be concerned about con-
sumer rights for their own sake: You should know
exactly what you are buying, which may include infor-
mation on how the product was generated, regardless of
whether there is a risk associated with it or not. The one
to decide is yourself. The Entrepreneurs argumentation
is that of risk prevention: If you buy a food product that
could be hazardous to your health, then you should
know. But if a risk is improbable, labelling is inappropri-
atethe one to decide is the expert. Labelling may even
be a disadvantage for the product on the market place,
wich is a risk for the producer. Hence, competing ration-
alities may perceive an apparent objective risk-based
labelling strategy to be skewed towards the producers
interests.
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM
AS THE NORMAL CASE
Coming back to European biotechnology regulation,
it is obvious that finding a solution suitable for all
countries and groups is no simple task. The EU Commis-
sion tries to uphold a scientific and economic rationality
in order to overcome internal non-tariff trade impedi-
ments, but the problem is deeper and more complex. Not
only is it a matter of reducing risks or preventing haz-
ards, it is also a question of how modernisation is seen,
who benefits from the advantages and who has to bear
the burdens. Thus, the perceived biotechnology problem
currently observed in Europe is part of the well-known
debate about risks in a modern society. Such controversies
have been going on for decades both in Europe and also in
the US, where they at times have been even more vivid.
They were mostly labelled as pure risk issues and fought
out with a lot of scientific expertise from both sides.
But, after all, is there such a thing as a pure risk
controversy? Questions of equity, distribution and fair-
ness, which are clearly non-scientific in their nature,
always flagged up. Although different subjects cannot
be compared on a one-to one basis, a general comparison
of the ways controversies were carried out in the US and
in Europe reveal elements beyond scientific argumenta-
tion. Not only are there differences in the juridical sys-
tems, but also in the perception of the states agenda, for
example in the question whether a particular risk is
considered publicly relevant. One crucial determinant in
the US is whether a risk is deliberately imposed on
individuals offending their rights.30 For example, smok-
ing put non-smokers sitting next to a smoker at risk, so
legal action is possible. In contrast, radon, a major health
hazard, has been publicly debated, but was not of a
concern to policy because nobody imposes a risk on the
individual. In Europe, concerns are less dominated by the
question whether a risk is imposed and somebody being
liable, but rather whether the risk is possible and how
the state may protect its citizens. Clearly, differences
between European countries are profound also in this
respect, with Britain coming closest to the US in the focus
on individual rights. We consider such differences as
ultimately linked to the respective political cultures.
Although for example controversies over waste treat-
ment facilities, as hazardous waste incinerators or su-
perfund sites in the U.S, have been a major cause of
recurrent public debate and policy initiatives also in
Europe,31 US and European controversies differ often in
the issues and in the point in time they arise. Automobile
safety and smoking have been addressed much earlier in
the US, as well as releases of GMOs (the Ice-minus
bacteria), which has become a non-issue now. Genetic
testing is considered a current field of conflict mainly in
the US due to the potential impact on personal insurance
and employment. In Europe, testing is of much lesser
concern than GMO products. This reflects obvious dif-
ferences in the social security systems, but also in the
attitude towards individual privacy.
The US experienced even food controversies where
scientific evidence was doubtful, as in the debate over
food additives and pesticide (Alar) residues on fruit,
although they never reached the level of, e.g., the Euro-
pean BSE scandal. Notwithstanding the different atti-
tudes towards food properties and new technologies, if
US public perception of possible risks would put a ques-
tionmark to the current positive emphasis on food
biotechnology as an entrepreneurial opportunity, a
fierce labelling debate could arise. Some recent policy
lawsuits already point in that direction.32 As most par-
ties agree, agricultural biotechnology could have, or is
about to have, a profound influence on the way we
produce and consume our food. Hence, with regard to
its potential societal impact, one may rather consider the
exemption of modern biotechnology from the risk and
modernisation debate, as observed in the US until now,
as the anomaly, and the presence of a biotechnology
problem in Europe as the normal case.
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The obviously wider scope of the debate beyond simple
risk determination may also be the reason for the ob-
served backlash for agricultural biotechnology in Europe
during recent years. As the fates of the first genetically
modified commodity products show, the interpretation
that only scientific risk arguments are valid has been
challenged. Regulators, forced to find an answer, have to
react to the challenge. Currently there is a tendency to
open up a backdoor in thatalthough not openly ex-
pressedalso a more culturally related rationality may
be taken into account. This rationality concedes that
there are, besides scientific proof, other more subjectively
or even individually determined qualitative criteria
which may serve as a base for a (temporary) policy in a
particular area.
Such a development is hard to understand and may
be a disappointment to those who wish to see in place
exclusively evidence-based, scientifically sound and ra-
tional regulations not entailing exceeding costs and,
most important, promoting free tradeif there ever
existed such a thing. Consequently, tensions may arise
between the EU with its many cultures and countries,
and its partners advocating a purely scientific and eco-
nomic view of the world like the US But after all, even
the seemingly rational style of regulation in the US is the
outcome of a specific national culture and has developed
under certain historical conditions.33 So let us try to
better understand the different conditions and cultures
instead of accusing each other to be irrational. There
is definitely more than one single rationality.
n
ENDNOTES
1 This article is based on a paper given at the 1998 annual Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 1217 February, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia.
2 The authors are members of the Concerted Action Groups Biotechnology and the
European Public and European Debates on Biotechnology: The Dimensions of Public
Concern, funded by the European Community (Contracts nos. B104-CT950043 and
B104980488). HT was supported by a grant from the Austrian Fonds zur Frderung
der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (no. P11849-SOZ) and by the Austrian Federal
Ministry of Science and Traffic (GZ 650.275/2-III/2a/99).
3 Biotechnology and the European Public ConcertedActionGroup (BEP), Europe ambivalent
on biotechnology, Nature 387, 26 June 1997, 845847 (1997).
4 J. Fox, US to EU: Please, pass the maize, Nature Biotechnology 16:1, 11 (1998).
5 H. I. Miller, Concepts of risk assessment: the process versus product controversy put to the
rest, in H. J. Rehm, G. Reed (eds.), Biotechnology (2nd ed.), vol. 12: legal, economic and
ethical dimensions, Verlag Chemie, Weinheim/New York (1995).
6 H. J.Miller,Nasty taste fromG-8GM foodpolicy, Nature Biotechnology17, 8, 730,August
1999.
7 The EUs fear of bioengineered foods ... is the single greatest trade threat that we face.
Stuart Eizenstat, nominee for a leading job at the US Treasury Department, testifying
before the US Senate on June 29, 1999.
8 S. Jasanoff, Product, process, or program: Three cultures and the regulation of biotechnology,
in M. Bauer (ed.), Resistance to new technology, 311331, Cambridge University Press
(1994).
9 H. Gottweis, Governing Molecules. The Discoursive Politics of Genetic Engineering in
Europe and the United States. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. (1995).
10 Council of the EC, Directives 90/219/EEC on the Contained Use and 90/220/EEC on the
Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms Into the Environment from 23. 4.
1990, ABl L 117/15, Brussels (1990).
11 M. Cantley, The Regulation of Modern Biotechnology: A Historical and European Perspective,
in D. Brauer (ed.), Biotechnology vol. 12: legal, economic and ethical dimensions,
505681, Verlag Chemie, Weinheim/New York (1995).
12 J. Hunt, The social construction of precaution, in T. ORiordan, J. Cameron, Interpreting
the precautionary principle, 172182, Earthscan, London (1994). The reductionist
approach can be paraphrased by a quote from the US National Research Councils Field
testing GeneticallyModified Organisms: Framework for Decisions (National Academy Press,
Washington D.C. (1989): With organisms modified by molecular methods, we are in
a better, if not perfect, position to predict the phenotypic expression.
13 J. Durant, M. Bauer, G. Gaskell (eds.), Biotechnology in the Public Sphere, Science
Museum, London (1998).
14 L. Levidow, S. Carr, R. von Schomberg, D. Wield, Regulating agricultural biotechnology in
Europe: harmonization difficulties, opportunities, dilemmas, Science and Public Policy 23,
135157 (1996). See also the country reports in this special issue on biotechnology
regulation.
15 R. v. Schomberg, An Appraisal of the Working in Practice of the Directive 90/220/EEC
on the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms, STOA, European Parlia-
ment, Luxembourg (1998).
16 supra note 15.
17 S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science advisors as policymakers, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA. (1990).
18 supra note 8.
19 European Commission, The European Commission has decided to propose further
labelling of genetically modified organisms, press release IP/97/269, Brussels (2. April
1997).
20 G. Gaskell, M. Bauer, J. Durant, N. Allum, Worlds apart? The reception of genetically
modified food in Europe and the US, SCIENCE 285, 384387 (16. July 1999).
21 supra note 13.
22 Interestingly, in countries like Finland, the experts role seemed to be unaffected and they
are still considered to be objective and rational. This is just another facet of European
divergence.
23 supra note 20.
24 For the relationship between knowledge, uncertainty and trust see N. Luhmann, Trust
and Power, Wiley, Chichester (1979).
25 supra note 13.
26 This is contrary to the situation with pharmaceuticals and other medical applications,
which are broadly accepted in Europe.
27 E. Dorey, EuropaBio unit created to boost agbio defense, Nature Biotechnology 17, 7,
631632 (July 1999).
28 According to the Guardian from 25.8.1999, an internal report into GM food conducted
by Deutsche Bank has been published by the Minnesota-based research group The
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. The report, published last month under the
heading AgBiotech: Thanks, But No Thanks says: GMOs are being demonised by their
opponents. What food manufacturer will take a bullet for GMO corn in the face of
such controversy?
29 T.H.Nielsen,Behind the color code of no,NatureBiotechnology15,7,13201321 (1997).
30 J. Linnerooth-Bayer, IIASA Laxenburg, personal communication; see also supra notes 8
and 9.
31 B. Davy, Essential Injustice, Springer Wien / New York (1997).
32 J. L. Fox, FDA, activists seek judgements in food policy lawsuits, Nature biotechnology 17,
8, 746747 (1999).
33 supra note 8.
Europe the Spoil-Sport: On the Europeans Reluctance Towards Genetically Modified Food 7
Volume 3 nn Number 2 2000
